Administration of Japanese ODA
Historically, the administration of Japanese aid has been divided principally between JICA and JBIC under the overall authority and coordination of MOFA. JICA has taken responsibility for technical cooperation and the distribution of some grant aid (MOFA has administered the majority of grants) and JBIC has taken charge of both ODA loans and export credit. A range of other ministries have also been involved (as listed below) which has served to make Japanese ODA policy making notoriously slow and bureaucratic on account of the differing interests and priorities brought to the table by each ministry. Following the October 2008 merger of JBIC and JICA, however, ODA loans, technical cooperation and grant aid have all been brought under the responsibility of JICA with a lesser proportion of grant aid remaining under MOFA. The merger has re-positioned the new JICA as one of the world’s largest bilateral aid agencies. Responsibilities under the new structure are broadly allocated as below.
In light of the recent restructuring of Japanese aid and concerns raised by NGOs, the ODA guidelines are currently going through a further round of revision. The new Guidelines will apply to all forms of ODA administered by the new JICA (ODA loans, grant aid and technical cooperation) and are being drawn up through public meetings of a multi-stakeholder committee comprising four representatives from each civil society, academia, the private sector and government. Civil society representatives hope that one of the potential gains will be earlier disclosure of information and feasibility studies on potential projects.
Some improvements in this area are noted since 2002, including the release of information for major projects in local languages and the availability of limited information in English and Japanese. This information has helped civil society representatives initiate early warning procedures and provide some information to affected communities. Public disclosure of more detailed project information appears to have been hampered by the former division of responsibilities between JICA and JBIC, whereby JICA undertook EIA and feasibility studies and JBIC made decisions regarding loan terms and implementation. Although the intention was that JICA’s studies would inform and direct JBIC’s decisions on loans, in practice they have been used more actively to inform the grant agreements administered by MOFA/JICA (JICA 2001). With the transfer of loan responsibilities to the new JICA it is hoped that decisions and assistance can be better coordinated from within the same agency and that project information can be made more publicly available.
Institution / Responsibilities as of October 2008 (Old structure):
1. MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- Central coordinating role in ODA administration; leads ODA policy; administrative oversight of JICA; coordinates input to UN operations; implementation of some grants to meet foreign policy requirements; represents JICA in the Diet
2. JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency)
- Technical cooperation, grant aid and ODA loans
3. Ministry of Finance (MOF)
- Manages pass through funds for yen loans; coordinates IFI operations; specialised analysis
4. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
- Trade promotion and investment; Asia-Japan economic relations; energy and environment.
5. JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation)
- Export credit loans
6. Other government institutions: (a) Ministry of Education, (b) Ministries of Health; Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Land; Public Management; Justice; Environment, and agencies for the National Police, Financial Service and Cabinet:
(a) Overseas students and university exchange
(b) Technical cooperation (including dispatch of experts and training programmes)
7. Non-government institutions: (a) NGOs, (b) Private sector, (c) Academia:
a) Policy and project implementation, debate
(b) Policy lobby, implementation, contracting
(c) Studies, policy, advocacy
Observations: A unique evolution with multiple drivers
The factors that have shaped and driven Japanese environmental ODA have been multiple and complex, firmly rooted in Japan’s own post-war development and evolving over time in response to domestic and international realities.
1. The nature of Japan’s interdependency with the rest of the world (and Asia in particular) has been a key factor in determining its approach to environmental ODA
Mutual benefits have been especially visible in Asia where the Japanese economy has prospered through strong regional trade links and the economic growth of recipient countries has been accelerated by Japanese investment and the export trade.
2. Japan’s environmental ODA has long since focused on the transfer of infrastructure and technology – areas in which Japan has developed a competitive advantage
Japan has traditionally favoured the transfer of infrastructure and technology as the cornerstone of development. This has been a particular feature of Japanese loan aid and has its roots in Japan’s own transition from a rural to industrial economy following the Second World War and the underlying belief in economic growth as a basis for poverty reduction.
3. The non-confrontational, self-help philosophy of Japanese aid has led to a principle of non-interference in the implementation of many environmental assistance projects – this has been at the cost of weak monitoring frameworks
The tendency in Japan’s foreign policy of avoiding diplomatic conflict appears to have its roots both in Japan’s history as a war-time aggressor, and in Japanese cultural norms that militate against problem solving through direct confrontation. In its ODA, these historical and cultural elements coincide with the philosophy of self-help and have led to an emphasis on recipient countries assuming early ownership of their environmental problems and the associated projects.
4. Japan did not meet its desired ambition of becoming a global leader in international environmental cooperation but it has successfully asserted a certain level of regional leadership
However, through its close geographic ties and long-standing aid relationships with Asia, Japan has gained a certain level of influence and leverage in the region that western aid agencies may be less able to achieve. There is a need for some caution in the (often selective) promotion and adoption of the Japanese model – experience has taught Japan the true cost of economic growth at the expense of environmental neglect and public health crises.
5. Japan’s foreign policy interests and aspirations will evolve further in the coming years, presenting both opportunities and threats to the prioritisation of environmental ODA
The fact that overall responsibility for Japanese aid rests with MOFA is a clear indication of the positioning of ODA, as a foreign policy issue.
If the rest of the industrialised world has struggled to comprehend the Japanese approach to ODA, the emergence of South Korea, India and China as donors will prove further challenges yet. China’s proliferation of trade and aid with Africa has generated reactions among other donor nations ranging from surprise and admiration to moral indignation.
SOURCE:
“From crisis to Kyoto and beyond: The evolution of environmental concerns in Japanese official development assistance”, Nicole Armitage, November 2009, Nagoya University http://www.gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp/bpub/research/public/paper/article/176.pdf